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EMERALD COAL RESOURCES, L.P. V COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OFENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: LETTER OF LAW
TRUMPS MINER SAFETY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Accounting for almost a fifth of the United States' energy consumption in 2009, coal energy plays a central role in the country's
energy policy.' Unfortunately, coal mining safety issues have long
been a drawback of the industry despite the resource's great importance.2 Tragedies ranging from the 1907 Darr Mine disaster in
Pennsylvania that claimed 239 lives, to the recent explosion on
April 5, 2010 at the Upper Big Branch Mine in West Virginia that
killed 29, exemplify the perils of coal mine work. 3 While safety improvements have been slowed by mine owner appeals of the sanctions and penalties imposed upon them,4 federal and state agencies
have promulgated regulations in an attempt to alleviate the
dangers.5
In Pennsylvania, the Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act of 2008
(Act) gives the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) discretion to issue administrative orders in response to
an accident as the agency deems appropriate.6 The Act defines ac1. Primary Energy Flow by Source and Sector, 2009, U.S. Dept. of Energy, http://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pecss-diagram_2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2011) (noting that coal comprised 19.7% of U.S. energy consumption in 2009).
2. See Why Do We Still Have Mining Disasters?,N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE
BLoc (Apr. 7, 2010, 9:06 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/
04/07/why-do-we-still-have-mining-disasters (asking why, after long history of injury and death, coal mining remains so dangerous).
3. See U.S. MiningDisasters, MINING-TECHNOLOGY.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), http://
www.mining-technology.com/features/feature82279/ (noting that between 1830
and 2000, 15,183 miners were killed in 716 separate accidents in U.S.).
4. See Gardiner Harris & Erik Eckholm, Mines Fight Strict Laws By Filing More
Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/us/07
company.html?_r=1&ref=us (reporting that operators appeal one in four citations
issued against coal mines, three times greater than average appeal rate).
5. See History of Mine Safety & Health Legislation, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/MSHAINF2.HTM (last visited Apr. 6,
2011)

(documenting federal mine safety statutes); see also Laura Walker, Penn-

sylvania Closer to Mine Safety Law Overhaul EHS TODAY (Jan. 4, 2008), http://ehs
(noting
today.com/safety/confined-spaces/ehs-imp_77498/index.html
sylvania's new mine legislation will overhaul outdated regulations).

Penn-

6. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.109(b) (2010) (providing that, in event of accident occurring at mine, DEP shall take whatever action it deems appropriate, including issuance of orders to protect life, health, or safety of individuals).

(357)
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cidents as "unanticipated event[s] including any" of fourteen listed
events. 7 In Emerald Coal Resources, L.P. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection (Emerald Coal),8 the
DEP issued compliance orders to Emerald Coal Resources (Emeraid) and Cumberland Coal Resources (Cumberland) for failing to
notify the DEP of unanticipated events under section 109(a) (1) of
the Act and "posted procedures," respectively.9
The coal companies appealed to the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB), which has authority to review the
DEP's decisions on a de novo basis. 10 The DEP filed for summary
judgment." The appeals centered on two main issues: first,
whether the two "unanticipated events" were accidents under the
Act; and second, whether the DEP had authority to expand the definitions of sections of the Act by adjudication rather than through
the Act's newly established Board of Coal Mine Safety's (Board)
rulemaking process.' 2 The EHB denied the DEP's motion for summary judgment, holding that, while the two events were likely acci7. Id. § 690.104 (2010) (detailing fourteen events that constitute unanticipated events). Unanticipated events include the following:
(1) A death of an individual at a mine. (2) An injury to an individual at a
mine, which has a reasonable potential to cause death. (3) An entrapment of an individual at a mine which has a reasonable potential to cause
death or serious injury. (4) An unplanned inundation of a mine by a
liquid or gas. (5} An unplanned ignition or explosion of gas or dust. (6)
An unplanned mine fire not extinguished within ten minutes of discovery. (7) An unplanned ignition or explosion of a blasting agent or explosive. (8) An unplanned roof fall at or above the anchorage zone in active
workings where roof bolts are in use. (9) An unplanned roof or rib fall in
active workings that impairs ventilation or impedes passage. (10) A coal
or rock outburst that causes withdrawal of miners or which disrupts regular mining activity for more than one hour. (11) An unstable condition at
an impoundment or refuse pile which does any of the following: (i) Requires emergency action to prevent failure. (ii) Causes individuals to
evacuate an area. (12) Failure of an impoundment or refuse pile. (13)
Damage to hoisting equipment in a shaft or slope which endangers an
individual or which interferes with the use of the equipment for more
than 30 minutes. (14) An event at a mine which causes death or bodily
injury to an individual not at the mine at the time the event occurs.
Id.
8. No. 2009-023-L, 2010 WL 944146, *1-2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24,
2010).
9. See id. at *1-2 (detailing issuance of compliance orders to Emerald and
Cumberland).
10. See History of the Environmental Hearing Board, THE PENNSyLVANiA ENVrTL.
HEARuNc BOARD, http://ehb.courtapps.com/content/ehbhistory.php (last visited
Apr. 6, 2011) (highlighting that EHB has ability to review DEP decisions).
11. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 9441466 at *2 (noting how DEP moved for summary judgment in both Emerald and Cumberland appeals).
12. See id. at *4 (finding EHB was more concerned with method DEP chose to
implement sections 104 and 109 rather than DEP's interpretation of section 104).
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dents under the Act, the rulemaking process must be followed
because adjudication would not be consistent or fair within the
Act's framework.' 3
This Note examines the EHB's decision in Emerald Coal. Part II
of this Note analyzes the disagreement between the DEP and the
mining companies.1 4 Part III discusses the laws governing mine
safety.' 5 Part IV reviews the basis for the EHB's decision in Emerald
Coal.'6 Part V critically analyzes the EHB's decision to distinguish
between expansion and interpretation as well as the resulting effect
on the purpose of the Act.17 Finally, Part VI examines the impact
the Emerald Coal decision will have on administrative agencies' ability to formulate policy by adjudication and rulemaking as well as the
decision's influence on mine safety. 18
II.

FACTS

In 2008, the Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act of 2008 was
signed into law. 19 Under section 109 of the Act, mine operators
must notify the DEP of "accidents" that occur at their mines. 20 Section 104 defines accidents as "unanticipated event[s]" and includes
fourteen listed examples.2 1 At Emerald's bituminous coal mine in
Wayne Township and at Cumberland's bituminous coal mine in
Waynesburg, unanticipated events occurred that were not reported
to the DEP. 2 2
13. See id. (holding that EHB was unable to support DEP's issuance of orders
for several reasons).
14. For a further discussion of the facts of Emerald Coal, see infra notes 19-38
and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of Pennsylvania mining regulations, see infra
notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
16. For a narrative analysis of the EHB's decision in Emerald Coal, see infra
notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
17. For a critical analysis of the EHB's decision in Emerald Coal, see infra notes
117-53 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of Emerald Coal, see infra notes 154-84 and
accompanying text.
19. Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. ofPa., Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., No. 2009-023-L,
2010 WL 944146, *9 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (noting signing of Act
in July 2008).
20. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.109(a)(1) (2010) (stating that operator must notify DEP within fifteen minutes of discovering accident).
21. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.104 (2010) (noting fourteen defined occurrences under Act). For a list of the enumerated unanticipated events, see supra
note 7.
22. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *1-2 (identifying failure of Emerald
and Cumberland to notify DEP and DEP's later discovery of unreported, unanticipated events).
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On January 19, 2009, Emerald Coal had planned a cut-through
from the B-7 section of its mine to the B-6 section.2 3 This cutthrough would create an air connection; therefore, Emerald scheduled a mine examiner to close doors installed to prevent unsafe
ventilation. 24 Before the cut-through, however, the mine examiner
mistakenly left the B-6 section without closing the doors. 25 Although no harm occurred, Emerald officials did not follow their
own procedures for safe ventilation, and the incident posed a threat
to the miners' health and safety.2 6 Because Emerald did not notify
the DEP about the unanticipated event, the agency issued a compliance order citing Emerald for violating section 109(a) (1) of the
Act.2 7
On February 12, 2009, an electrical storm disabled a ventilation fan at a bleeder shaft in Cumberland's mine for over fifteen
minutes, and the diesel powered back-up system also failed to
start.2 8 Cumberland began to evacuate the mine and, while no one
was injured, the fan outage posed a threat to the health and safety
of the miners who had to evacuate on foot over long distances. 29
Cumberland also did not notify the DEP, which then issued an order for violating posted procedures.3 0
Emerald and Cumberland appealed their orders, asserting that
because their respective events were not listed among the Act's
fourteen examples of accidents, the events did not qualify as accidents.3 1 The parties also claimed the DEP's interpretations were
unreasonable and inconsistent with the legislative intent behind the

23. Id. at *1 (relating Emerald's planned cut-through from section B-7 to section B-6).
24. See id. (noting mine inspector's role in cut-through operation).
25. Id. (highlighting failure to follow plan and disputing whether air reversal
actually occurred).
26. See id. (stating that Emerald did not contest that incident posed risk to
miners).
27. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *1 (discussing occurrence of unanticipated event and Emerald's failure to notify DEP in timely manner).
28. Id. (noting how backup system failed and system was restarted by electrician after 16 minutes and 40 seconds).
29. Id. (describing threat from outage of ventilation fan and evacuation of
miners over long distance on foot).
30. Id. at *2 (highlighting that no statutory section was listed in Cumberland
order).
31. See id. (noting consolidation of appeals and arguing that including, as
used in Act, is limiting term).
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Act.3 2 Lastly, Emerald and Cumberland argued that summary judg33
ment was inappropriate, as disputed issues of fact still existed.
Conversely, the DEP filed for summary judgment, claiming the
events were accidents that required notification.3 4 The DEP also
stated that the term accident is not ambiguous, and even if it were,
the DEP's interpretation that included the two disputed events was
reasonable.3 5 Finally, the DEP asserted that it had the necessary
authority under the Act to issue the orders.3 6 The EHB focused on
the new rulemaking procedures established under the Act in determining that the DEP had overstepped its bounds in issuing the orders.37 Accordingly, the EHB denied the DEP's motion for
summary judgment.3 8
III.

BACKGROUND

Coal mining is one of the most dangerous industries in the
United States, with a fatal injury rate almost six times that of private
industry.39 Underground bituminous coal mining, at issue in Emerald Coal, employs more than half of all U.S. miners and experiences
a higher share of injuries, illnesses, and fatalities than any other
form of coal mining.40 Possible exposure to methane gas, poor ventilation, high temperatures and humidity, and coal dust makes un32. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *2 (claiming DEP is conducting unlawful
stealth regulation).
33. Id. at *2 n.1 (noting that summary judgment is appropriate when record
establishes there are no genuine issues of material fact and moving party is entitled
to judgment as matter of law).
34. Id. at *2 (claiming that events were defined by Act and operators failed to
notify DEP as required).
35. Id. (arguing that term accident is not ambiguous and DEP's interpretation rightly includes two events).
36. Id. (noting that DEP has provided adequate notice regarding accident notice requirement, that opportunity to appeal to EHB protects operators' due process rights, and that rules and regulations posted at Cumberland require
notification).
37. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *4-5 (finding DEP had attempted to
expand section 104's list by issuing compliance orders).
38. Id. at *8 (denying DEP's motion for summary judgment).
39. Injuries, Illnesses and Fatalities in the Coal Mining Industry, U.S. DEPT. OF LAOF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 2010), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/
BOR, BuREAu
osh/os/osar0012.htm (detailing fatal and non-fatal coal mining injuries in 2007).
In private industry, the total fatalities amounted to 4.3 cases per 100,000 full-time
equivalent workers. Id. In coal mining, the total fatalities were 24.8 per 100,000
full-time equivalent workers. Id.
40. See id. (discussing how mining industry is divided into bituminous coal
underground mining, bituminous coal and lignite surface mining, and anthracite
mining). The rate of non-fatal injuries and illnesses in 2008 per 100 full-time
workers was 6.5 for underground bituminous coal mining, 2.0 for bituminous coal
and lignite surface mining, and 6.2 for anthracite mining. Id.
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derground coal mining hazardous' 1 As the coal mining industry
today recruits skilled individuals to operate complex equipment to
efficiently extract coal,4 2 federal and state governments have introduced new regulations and standards for mining conditions to safeguard miners' health.43
A.

State Control and Previous Legislation

While the federal government regulates mine safety through
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), state governments are permitted to implement more stringent laws, which may
not fall below the floor set by federal regulations. 44 Although states
can normally become primary enforcers of federal statutes, they do
not possess the power to implement federal mine safety laws and,
therefore, must enact and enforce their own safety programs. 45
The statute at issue in Emerald Coal is Pennsylvania's Bituminous
Coal Mine Safety Act, which replaced prior mine legislation in
2008.46
The previous act, the Bituminous Coal Mine Act of 1961, had
its roots in nineteenth century legislation and failed to provide an
adequate means for Pennsylvania to address modern mining con-

41. See NIOSH Office of Mine Safety and Health Research Topic: Ventilation, NAT'L
INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/

topics/topicpage30.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (listing hazards faced in underground mining).
42. See Coal Mining, WORLD COAL Ass'N, http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coalmining/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (discussing how technological advancements
have made coal mining more efficient and increased need for well-trained, highly
skilled workers).
43. See History of Mine Safety & Health Legislation, supra note 5 (noting that
Congress passed Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response Act (MINER
Act) in 2006). "The MINER Act amended the Mine Act to require mine-specific
emergency response plans in underground coal mines." Id. It also created new
regulations that focused on mine rescue teams and the sealing of abandoned areas, mandated prompt notification when mine accidents occur, and created
stronger civil penalties. Id.
44. See 30 U.S.C. § 955 (2006) (providing that state laws are not considered to
be "in conflict with this chapter").
45. See 40 Pa. Bull. 3836 (July 10, 2010), available at http://www.pabulletin.
com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1247.html (stating abilities of state government to
implement coal mining safety programs). While states are often able to obtain
primary enforcement authority of federal statues, they do not have authority to
enforce the Mine Safety Act. Id.
46. Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. Of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2009-023L, 2010 WL 944146, at *9 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (Krancer, J.,
concurring) (describing signing of Act in July 2008).
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cerns.4 7 A major problem with the old law, illustrated by the
Quecreek Mine accident in 2002,48 was the state's lack of power to
fine mining companies and mine operators for violations. 49 More
importantly, under the previous legislation, DEP Acting Secretary
John Hanger stated that the DEP lacked authority to write new regulations to correct problems found in the state's mine safety law.5 0
B.

Bituminous Coal Mine Safety Act of 2008

As previously discussed, the Act provided the first major update
to Pennsylvania's mining law since 1961.51 Established "to protect
the lives, health and safety of those who work at mines in this Commonwealth,"52 the Act was the result of five years of work among
industry representatives, workers, and the government.5 3 The final
version passed the Pennsylvania General Assembly unanimously. 54
One of the most important provisions of the Act is section 106,
which created the Board of Coal Mine Safety.5 5 Governor Edward
Rendell's press release upon signing the Act labeled the Board as
the "most significant" part of the Act.5 6 The Act established the
Board to provide the means to respond quickly to changes in min47. See Mining Tragedies Spur Analysis in Pennsylvania, NPR (Jan. 24, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5170932 (noting that previous act dealt with regulation of mules in mines and other obsolete issues).
48. See Laura Walker, Pennsylvania'sNew Mine Safety Board Holds First Meeting,
EHS TODAY (Jan. 8, 2009), http://ehstoday.com/safety/news/pennsylvania-mine_
safety_0108/ (discussing Quecreek Mine incident, where nine Pennsylvania coal
miners were trapped underground for three days before being rescued).
49. See Mining Tragedies Spur Analysis in Pennsylvania, supra note 47 (noting
how fines were imposed by federal government, not by state authorities, and that
ability to administer fines is part of "critical new legislation").
50. See Walker, supranote 48 (identifying that DEP previously lacked authority
to create regulations to remedy problems investigators found in state's mine safety
law).
51. See Walker, supra note 5 (noting legislation is first significant update to
state mining laws since 1961).
52. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.103(a) (2010) (stating that it is in public
interest to establish plan to protect lives, health, and safety of miners in Commonwealth). The Act also declares that the first priority of the bituminous coal mining
industry must be the health and safety of those who work at mines. Id.
53. Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. Of Pa., Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., No. 2009-023L, 2010 WL 944146, at *9 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (Krancer, J.,
concurring) (citing participation by Pennsylvania Coal Association, United Mine
Workers Union, and administration, primarily through DEP).
54. See id. at *9 (finding Act had earned backing of mine owners and operators, workers, and administration, and passed Pennsylvania House and Senate by
votes of 203 to zero and fifty to zero, respectively).
55. Id. at *10 (citing establishment of Mine Safety Board as one of Act's major
highlights).
56. See id. (highlighting Governor Rendell's remarks that reiterate importance of Board and its power).
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ing technology and conditions.5 7 The Board is comprised of seven
members representing the DEP, workers, and owners/operators,5 8
and has the authority to write new mine-safety regulations.5 9 The
DEP lacked power to write new mining regulations on its own
under the previous statute, but the new Act gives the Board the
ability to expand the Act at its discretion.6 0
The Act also defines an accident under section 104 as an unanticipated event, including fourteen listed examples.6 1 While the Act
does not specifically list the events that occurred in Emerald Coal, in
McClellan v. Health Maintenance OrganizationofPennsylvania62 and Velocity Express v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,6 3 events
were deemed reportable accidents if they were of the same general
kind, class, or nature as the provided examples.6 4 Further, in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto-Rest Park Cemetery Ass'n 65
and Readinger v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board,66 use of the
word "including" was held to show intent to expand, rather than
limit, the definition.6 7
57. Id. at *11 (noting comments by Governor Rendell, Secretary McGinty,
and Secretary Hanger that Board will be able to act more quickly than existing
regulatory process).
58. See Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. Of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2009023-L, 2010 WL 944146, at *10 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (Krancer, J.,
concurring) (describing balanced membership, consisting of three representatives
from workers/unions, three representatives from owners/operators, and one representative from DEP).
59. See 40 Pa. Bull. 3836 (July 10, 2010), available at http://www.pabulletin.
com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1247.html (discussing statutory authority pursuant
to sections 106, 106.1, and 106.2 to adopt regulations implementing Act, including
additional safety standards).
60. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *10 (Krancer, J., concurring) (stating
that Board has authority to write new mine safety regulations, which DEP was unable to do under prior statute).
61. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.104 (2010) (noting fourteen defined unanticipated events under Act). For a list of these events, see supra note 7.
62. 686 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1996).
63. 853 A.2d 1182 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
64. See generally McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 686 A.2d 801, 805 (Pa.
1996) (finding "health care provider" to be potentially broad enough to be construed as same type of event as listed in examples); see also Velocity Express v. Pa.
Human Relations Comm'n, 853 A.2d 1182. 1186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (citing finding in McClellan that general expressions preceding specific lists of included items
should not be interpreted in their widest context, resulting in exclusion of delivery
service providers from specific list of professionals governed by Fair Housing Act).
65. 306 A.2d 881 (Pa. 1973).
66. 855 A.2d 952 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
67. See Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Rest Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d
881, 885-86 (Pa. 1973) (finding that term including demonstrates legislative intent
for possible expansion rather than restriction of definition); see also Readinger v.
Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 855 A.2d 952, 954-55 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (noting
same finding as Alto-Rest case).
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In the event of an accident, section 109(a) of the Act requires
mine owners to notify the DEP within fifteen minutes of the occurrence. 68 Once notified, the DEP may assert its authority granted by
section 109(b) to "[t]ake whatever action it deems appropriate, including the issuance of orders, to protect the life, health, or safety
of an individual."6 9 The Act also holds mine owners responsible for
safety at their mines, stating that owners or operators "can be held
criminally liable" for their actions.70
C.

Administrative Agencies: Adjudication Versus Rulemaking

Section 501 of the Act permits the DEP to "issue written orders
to enforce this act, to effectuate the purposes of this act and to
protect the health and safety of miners and individuals in and about
mines." 7 Both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency (Beazer) ,72 and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Norristown Area School District
(Norristown),T7 have noted that administrative agencies, such as the

DEP, traditionally have the option of choosing between adjudication or rulemaking when interpreting statues and regulations.7 4
In Beazer, the defendant was found to have committed four violations in the operation of its coal tar plant in Follansbee, West Virginia.75 Beazer East, Inc. objected to the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) decision to interpret the words "tanks" and "surface
impoundments" through adjudication, but the Third Circuit found
the EPA was addressing "interpretive" rules, which interpret language in published regulations, rather than "legislative" rules,
which impose new legal duties upon parties and must follow notice
68. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.109(a) (1) (2010) (imposing operator's duty
to promptly notify DEP upon occurrence of accident).
69. See id. § 690.109(b) (2010) (explaining DEP's responsibilities upon occurrence of accident).
70. See Walker, supra note 5 (noting possibility of criminal liability for mineowners who violate Act).
71. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.501 (a) (1) (2010) (providing that DEP may issue
written orders to enforce Act and protect miners).
72. 963 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1992).
73. 374 A.2d 671 (Pa. 1977).
74. See id. at 677 (noting that administrative agencies may proceed by
rulemaking or adjudication, and nothing in Administrative Agency Law or PHRA
prevents Commission from proceeding by adjudication); see also Beazer East, Inc. v.
US. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 609 (3d Cir. 1992) (reaching same
holding as Norristown).
75. See Beazer, 963 F.2d at 604 (detailing issuance by EPA of four violations
under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
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and comment procedures. 7 6 The EPA, in the Third Circuit's view,
therefore did not need to proceed with notice and comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.77
In Noristown, a school district appealed the result of an adjudication by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC),
claiming that the PHRC had engaged in rulemaking by treating desegregation "guidelines" as regulations that carried the force of law
rather than as mere statements of policy. 78 The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ruled that the guidelines were statements of policy,
and noted that nothing in administrative law or the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act required rulemaking over adjudication.7 9
Although contrary to the normal practice of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly, an agency's adjudicatory power can be denied or
limited if it is the Assembly's true legislative intent to do so. 8 0 In
Department of Environmental Resources v. Butler County Mushroom
Farm,8 1 the Department of Environmental Resources (DER) ordered Butler County Mushroom Farm (Butler) to develop a system
to identify all persons underground at any time. 8 2 Butler appealed
the order, claiming the DER lacked authority to issue such an order.8 3 The Commonwealth Court found the DER had overstepped
its delegated authority and was only able to offer instructions for
correcting violations. 8 4 Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the DER's interpretation placed too much emphasis on "instruction" and thereby turned an enforcement device
76. See id. at 604, 606 (finding that interpretive rules and statements of policy
are exempted from notice and comment requirement of Administrative Procedure
Act).
77. See id. at 610 (noting how EPA made reasonable attempt to fill interstices
of complex regulatory scheme by giving meaning to language with its authority to
define).
78. See Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671,
676-77 (Pa. 1977) (arguing that Commission's announcement of guidelines constituted rulemaking and regulations, rather than statements of policy).
79. See id. at 676-78 (observing that legislature envisioned adjudicative case-bycase approach to eliminate racial imbalance in public schools).
80. See Dept. of Envtl. Res. v. Butler County Mushroom Farm, 454 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa.
1982) [hereinafter Butler il] (noting how Commonwealth Court holding restricted
DER's adjudicatory power contrary to normal practice).
81. 454 A.2d I (Pa. 1982).
82. See id. (issuing order for implementation of check system to identify all
persons underground at any time).
83. See id. (challenging DER's authority to issue order by filing appeal with
EHB).
84. See Butler Cnty. Mushroom Farm v. Dept. of Enytl. Res., 432 A.2d 1135, 1137
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) [hereinafter Butler 1] (concluding that DER personnel
were merely able to enter work places and issue instructions for correction of violations), overruled by Butler II, 454 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1982).
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into a non-binding educational tool. 85 The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court held that under sections 12 and 13 of the Pennsylvania General Safety Law Act, the legislature's intention was to give the DER

adjudicatory power to issue necessary orders to correct violations.8 6
Adjudication and rulemaking are appropriate in different situations.8 7 In Norristown, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found
that adjudication is best suited for case-specific factual situations involving the implementation of existing requirements. 8 8 Conversely,
in Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Cohen,8 9 Pennsylvania's
highest court determined that rulemaking is appropriate for creating new rules and provides more advance notice than
adjudication.9 0
IV.

NARRATIVE

ANALYSIS

The EHB denied the DEP's motion for summary judgment in
Emerald Coal, disagreeing with the DEP's interpretation of the Act.9 '
While the EHB agreed in part that accidents are not restricted to

the fourteen listed unanticipated events, 92 it found the manner in

85. See Butler II, 454 A.2d at 5 (holding that Commonwealth Court's decision
contradicted legislature's intent to provide enforcement device).
86. See id. at 4-5 (examining sections 12 and 13 of Pennsylvania General Safety
Law Act and noting legislative intent to give broad meaning to word
"instructions").
87. See generally Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. Of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
No. 2009-023-L, 2010 WL 944146, at *4-5 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010)
(finding that, while adjudication and rulemaking are not mutually exclusive, adjudication is not best for promulgating new requirements).
88. See Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671,
677 (Pa. 1977) (holding adjudication to be appropriate legislature-envisioned caseby-case approach to eliminate racial imbalance in public schools).
89. 292 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Pa. 1972).
90. See id. at 282-83 (finding belief that entitlement to evaluate "unprofessional conduct" on case-by-case basis was not based on statute or rule "suffers from
constitutional infirmities of vagueness").
91. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *3-4 (noting no dispute of material
facts). The EHB also observed that the Cumberland order cites only to "posted
procedures," which requires review, whereas Emerald's section 109 order requires
notification, investigation, corrective action, and reporting. See id.
92. See id. (observing that term including is attempt to enlarge rather than
limit, and if fourteen accidents were only accidents, there would be no unanticipated events under Act). The EHB found it impossible to list all unanticipated
events, noting that accidents are reportable if they are of same general kind, class,
or nature as the specifically mentioned examples, but the EHB agreed with the
DEP that events at Emerald and Cumberland were of same general kind and nature. Id.
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which the DEP attempted to enforce sections 104 and 109 of the
Act to be unacceptable.9 3
A.

An Unbridled Creation of New Regulations

The EHB held that the DEP attempted to expand the list of
unanticipated events in section 104 by issuing compliance orders,
which was inconsistent with the Act's framework.9 4 The EHB considered the provisions of the Act as a whole and held that, for the
first time in the history of Pennsylvania mine safety law, the Act
established a rulemaking mechanism for expanding upon a statute.9 5 In reading sections 104 and 109 along with 106 and 106.1,96
the EHB determined that the legislature established a process for
creating new standards and regulations, guaranteeing full participa-

tion by all key parties.9 7 Although it is more convenient for the
DEP to issue orders, the EHB noted that adjudications deny stakeholders their seat at the table, thus negating the legislature's aim of
incorporating all key parties in the process.98
Rather than an interpretation of existing regulations, the EHB
held that these two orders constituted new regulations, which made

uncontrolled cut-throughs and fan stoppages accidents warranting
DEP notification.9 9 The EHB considered that the orders would become binding precedent if upheld and, therefore, decided that new
regulations shall be established by rulemaking, not adjudication.

00

In his concurrence, Judge Michael Krancer noted that the Board's
mission is to revise regulations as needed, thereby rendering the
DEP's unilateral writing of recommendations illegal and impermis93. See id. at *4 (explaining that court cannot support adjudication because
unilateral adjudication is inappropriate).
94. See id. (finding that, while administrative agency can use rulemaking procedures or adjudications to formulate policy, agency's decision must be consistent
with enabling statute's framework).
95. Id. (discussing how adjudication avoids legislature's mechanism for "adding flesh to statutory bones" and Act as whole provides for rulemaking when all
provisions are given effect).
96. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *5 (detailing creation of Board of
Coal Mine Safety). The Board consists of seven members, with six split between
owners and workers and one representing the DEP, and is given power and instructions to promulgate regulations as well as safety standards. Id.
97. Id. at *9 (Krancer, J., concurring) (stressing importance of representing
all three parties in rulemaking).
98. Id. at *5 (noting importance of process and forward-thinking feature of
new statute).
99. Id. (discussing DEP's attempt to create "across-the-board" rule, which
would require notification of DEP within fifteen minutes of accident).
100. See id. at *5-6 (holding that when lawmaking requires promulgation of
new requirements, rulemaking rather than adjudication should be followed).
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sible.xox The EHB took careful notice of the guidance document
published by the DEP in 2005 to interpret the previous mine legislation.1 02 The guidance document directed that notice was required
for two events similar to the Emerald and Cumberland events: ventilation interruptions requiring withdrawal of personnel from the
mine and unplanned connections into abandoned working or
boreholes. 0 3 Those events, however, were not included in the new
Act, which instead listed fourteen events and placed a new rulemaking board in charge of filling in the needed details.10 4
Realizing that orders can bring serious consequences, including criminal liability, the EHB found it unfair to impose penalties
on mine operators for failing to give notice of unanticipated events
that are not described with any specificity in statutes or regulations. 0 5 The EHB found this practice would be an attempt at ad
hoc promulgation, more appropriately handled via the Board's
rulemaking process.' 06 Further, the EHB disagreed with the DEP's
contention that the orders were necessary for the health and safety
of miners, citing several other provisions of the Act which could be
relied upon in the event of hazardous conditions.107 Concluding
that sections 104 and 109 did not support the DEP's issuance of
orders to Emerald and Cumberland, the EHB denied the DEP's
motion for summary judgment. 0 8
B. Judge Mather's Defense of Adjudication
Judge Richard Mather dissented in part from the majority, explaining that the DEP is not required by the Act to operate under
101. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *10 (citing Governor's office statement
that "Board [of Coal Mine Safety] will have the authority to write new mine safety
regulations-something the department is unable to do through the existing
statute.").
102. See id. at *6 (noting DEP's issuance of guidance document).
103. Id. (discussing how legislature could have elected to expand definition of
term accident under new Act but chose not to do so). The two events omitted
were ventilation interruptions requiring withdrawal of personnel from the entire
mine and unplanned connections into abandoned working or boreholes. Id.
104. See id. (finding that legislature added phrase "an unanticipated event,
including. . ." to add some flexibility to statute).
105. See id. at *6-7 (observing that DEP's brief cites need to add "gloss" to
statute so only events that have already caused or reasonably could pose threat to
safety should be covered by term accident).
106. See Emerald Coa4 2010 WL 944146 at *7 (describing purpose of Board of
Mine Safety).
107. See id. (noting that DEP is able to monitor safe ventilation under section
690.211, equipment condition under section 690.201(2), duties of mine foreman
under section 690.212(a), and work requirements under section 690.201(1)).
108. See id. at *8 (denying DEP's motions for summary judgment).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2011

13

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 7

370 ViLLANovA

ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

JouRNAL

[Vol. XXII:

p. 357

the Board's authority to issue orders.10 9 The DEP on its own, Judge
Mather noted, had authority under the Act to examine unanticipated events on a case-by-case basis by issuing orders. 1 0 While he
agreed with the majority that the list of unanticipated events is nonexhaustive,'' he saw no reason to require rulemaking instead of
adjudication simply because such a procedure exists.' 1 2 Judge
Mather emphasized that "it is a basic tenet of administrative law
that agencies have some discretion to choose between adjudication
and rulemaking when interpreting statutes and regulations committed to their authority."" 3
Further, the dissent noted that sections 501 (a) (1) and
109(b) (1) of the Act give the DEP broad authority and discretion to
respond to accidents, including the express authority to issue an
order in connection with accidents." 4 As the Act's main goal is to
"protect the life, health or safety of an individual," Judge Mather
determined that the DEP was improperly stripped of its authority
when the majority held that it could not issue orders identifying
unanticipated events that qualify as accidents.1 5 Nevertheless,
Judge Mather concurred that the DEP had not met its burden for
summary judgment." 6

109. See id. at *12 (Mather, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding as matter of law that DEP must act with Board's backing).
110. Id. at *12, *16-17 (finding that DEP can "give meaning to and identify
additional unanticipated events at a mine that meet the statutory definition of 'accident' on a case-by-case basis by issuing an order.").
111. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *13 (stating that term including indicates additional events may be added).
112. See id. at *14 (explaining well-settled matter of law that administrative
agency may establish binding policy through rulemaking or adjudications, and that
nothing requires rulemaking over adjudication without statutory prohibition).
113. See id. at *16 (noting that nothing in Act prevents DEP from issuing orders); see also id. at *13 (quoting Beazer East, Inc. v. United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency, 963 F.2d 603, 609 (3d Cir. 1992)) (holding that section 106.1 does not
provide exclusive means for DEP to implement provisions under section 109 of
Act).
114. See id. at *13 (detailing provisions of section 109(b) (1)); see also id. at *16
(describing provisions of section 501 (a) (1)).
115. See id. at *13-15 (explaining Judge Mather's several objections to majority's ruling).
116. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *17 (concurring with majority's decision to deny motion for summary judgment).
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In determining that the DEP failed to meet its burden for summary judgment,11 7 the EHB ruled that the DEP exceeded its authority to enforce the Act by issuing orders to Emerald and
Cumberland." 8 Despite finding the events at the Emerald and
Cumberland mines to be of the same general nature as the events
listed in the Act, the EHB attempted to adhere to the letter of the
law by focusing on the Act's new rulemaking procedure.1 1 9 By doing so, the EHB questioned when it is appropriate for the DEP to
issue orders under the Act. 120 This ruling curtailed the DEP's ability to regulate mine safety and diluted the Act's primary purpose of
protecting the health and safety of mine workers by striking down
orders issued in the workers' interest.1 2'
A.

Expansion Versus Interpretation

The EHB found the DEP's orders to be a legislative expansion,
rather than an interpretation of an existing statute.12 2 In Beazer, the
court documented the distinction between legislative rules and interpretive rules.12 3 Legislative rules impose new legal duties upon
parties and must follow notice and comment procedures, whereas
interpretive rules interpret language in published regulations. 12 4
The EHB held that the DEP was prohibited from developing its in117. Id. at *8 (concluding that sections 104 and 109 do not support DEP's
issuance of orders to Emerald and Cumberland and denying DEP's motion for
summary judgment).
118. For a discussion of how the DEP exceeded its authority, see infra notes
122-34 and accompanying text.
119. Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. OfPa., Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., No. 2009-023L, 2010 WL 944146, at *4 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (noting that
events at mines were of same general kind as listed events in section 104, but Act
provides for rulemaking for first time in history of Pennsylvania mine safety law).
120. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.109(b) (1) (2010) (providing that DEP shall
"take whatever action it deems appropriate, including the issuance of orders, to
protect the life, health or safety of an individual"); see also id. § 690.501 (a) (1) (stating that DEP "may issue written orders to enforce this act, to effectuate the purposes of this act and to protect the health and safety of miners and individuals in
and about mines.").
121. See id. § 690.103(a) (1) (expressing that first priority must be health and
safety of persons working in and about mines).
122. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *4 (finding that DEP had attempted
to expand list in section 104 by issuing compliance orders).
123. See id. at *15 (Mather, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting longstanding reliance by Pennsylvania courts on federal reasoning in this area
of law).
124. For a discussion of the difference between legislative and interpretive
rules, see supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
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terpretation of accidents through adjudication because doing so
would expand the statute.12 5
The orders issued by the DEP, however, bear more resemblance to interpretation of the existing statutory language of unanticipated events than to a new promulgation.12 6 Consistent with
statutory construction, the majority found that the word "including," as used in the Act, intended expansion rather than a final determination.12 7 The EHB also determined that the events at
Emerald and Cumberland appeared to be of the same general kind
and nature as the fourteen listed events.'12 Though these rulings
appear to affirm the DEP's interpretation of the Act's language in
sections 104 and 109, the majority reversed course, holding that the
DEP's action was an attempt to create a rule establishing cutthrough errors and fan stoppages as accidents. 2 9 This judgment
significantly limits any alteration of the list in section 104, funneling
all the discretion and flexibility intended by the legislature into the
hands of the Board alone.13 0
The EHB determined that the Act calls for rulemaking, highlighting the Act's language directing the Board to develop
"[a]dditional regulations with respect to mine safety if the Board
determines that existing Federal and State regulations do not adequately address a specific hazard."13 ' By placing an emphasis on
rulemaking, the EHB effectively precludes any expansion to the list
of accidents through interpretation. 3 2 This approach allows the
DEP to issue orders to enforce the Act, yet lessens the significance
of this power by holding that all interpretation of regulations shall
125. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *15 (holding that uniqueness of
situation and interpretation of existing language permitted EPA to develop its interpretation of "tanks" and "surface impoundments" through adjudication).
126. See id. at *13 (explaining how orders that interpret or give meaning to
unanticipated events language fit within general grant of authority to protect life,
health, or safety of individuals).
127. Id. at *3 (basing support for expansion of term including upon impossibility of listing every event).
128. Id. at *4 (agreeing with DEP that events at Emerald and Cumberland
were of same general kind and nature as fourteen events specifically mentioned in
section 104).
129. Id. at *4 (holding that DEP attempted to expand list in section 104 by
issuing compliance orders).
130. Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *3 (finding it impossible to list every
unanticipated event that might qualify as accident and determining that legislature
intended some flexibility in defining boundaries and limits of accidents).
131. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.106(a) (2) (2010) (acknowledging Board's ability to pass additional regulations).
132. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *4 (deeming DEP's issuance of orders to be attempt at making law).
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be the Board's exclusive domain.13 3 Although this concept is consistent with the Act's call for rulemaking to ensure representation
of all views, it elevates interpretation to the level of
promulgation. 134
While not wholly indicative of intent, the Act's legislative history supports the EHB's ruling because ventilation interruptions
and cut-throughs were excluded in section 104 despite being included as accidents in past guidance documents.1 3 5 Furthermore,
the EHB felt it would be unfair to penalize Emerald and Cumberland for events that were not specifically described in the Act or any
regulation,1 3 6 even though Emerald and Cumberland both conceded these events posed possible threats to miners' safety.13 7
Neither Emerald nor Cumberland argued that the events were ordinary occurrences; both conceded that the events were unusual and
unanticipated.1 3 8 The EHB acknowledged that rulemaking is the
best means for forming new, generally applicable rules because of
the advanced notice it provides, while adjudication is suited for
case-by-case implementation of existing requirements. 1 3 9 The EHB
vaguely alluded to the potential for the DEP to issue future orders
for violations in "unique circumstances," but did not specify when
such an order would be appropriate. 14 0
B.

Weakening the Purpose of the Act

The Act's priority is to ensure the health and safety of all persons who work at mines.1 4 1 When the Pennsylvania Bituminous
133. See id. (holding that legislature created Board to "add flesh to statutory
bones").
134. See id. at *10 (Krancer, J., concurring) (finding membership of Board
was "serious bone of contention" during creation of Act, resolved by establishing
balanced membership of owner/operators and workers).
135. See id. at *6 (detailing how DEP's guidance for ventilation and boreholes
in prior law was excluded from list of accidents in section 104 of Act).
136. Id. (holding that citation of operators for events not specifically described in statutes or regulations is fundamentally unfair).
137. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *1 (discussing how Emerald and
Cumberland were not anticipating air connection during cut-through or fan stoppages and evacuation).
138. Id. (explaining that Emerald and Cumberland did not dispute that
events posed potential threat to health and safety of miners).
139. For a discussion of the difference between legislative and interpretive
rules, see supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
140. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *5 (declaring that EHB's intention is
not to completely "foreclose the possibility that unique circumstances in some future case may justify the issuance of an order requiring notification of an accident
for an incident not clearly spelled out in [s]ection 104.").
141. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.103(a) (1) (2010) (asserting that "first priority
and concern of all" must be health and safety of mine workers).
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Coal Mine Act of 1961 became outdated,1 42 the new Act was implemented to allow the "full extent of the Commonwealth's powers to
protect the lives, health and safety of miners and others in and
about underground bituminous coal mines."14 3 Consistent with this
goal, the DEP was given the authority to "[t]ake whatever action it
deems appropriate, including the issuance of orders, to protect the
life, health or safety of an individual." 14 4 Additionally, the DEP has
the power to "issue written orders to enforce this Act, to effectuate
the purposes of this Act and to protect the health and safety of miners and individuals in and about mines." 4 5
The EHB, however, placed more emphasis on rulemaking than
on the DEP's power to protect miners, essentially stripping the DEP
of its ability to issue orders for events outside those explicitly listed
in section 104.146 The EHB found that, while the DEP may take
action to ensure safety, it must do so in a manner consistent with
the Act's enabling framework.14 7 Somewhat contradictorily, the
EHB affirmed that the DEP may proceed by adjudication or
rulemaking as long as not otherwise stipulated,1 48 but also found
that under section 106(a), the privilege of adjudication had been
denied and a rulemaking procedure was required. 4 9
Coupled with the governor's signing statement declaring that
the DEP previously lacked authority to write regulations to correct
142. Id. § 690.103 (a) (4) (noting that previous act is outdated and lacks effective means to modify existing standards or adopt new standards).
143. Id. § 690.103(b) (1) (explaining that Act's purpose is to use full extent of
state's powers to ensure safety).
144. Id. § 690.109(b)(1) (giving DEP power to take whatever action it deems
will protect health and safety of miners).
145. Id. § 690.501 (a) (1) (providing that DEP may issue orders to enforce purpose of Act); see also id. § 690.105 (a) (3)-(4) (listing powers given to DEP, including
issuing orders and instituting procedures to implement provisions and effectuate
purpose of Act).
146. See Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. Of Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2009023-L, 2010 WL 944146, at *4 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (holding that
rulemaking procedure must be followed and DEP's expansion of section 104 was
unauthorized attempt to make law by adjudication).
147. See id. (explaining that choice of either adjudication or rulemaking must
be "reasoned, fair, and consistent with enabling statute's framework").
148. See id. (noting that administrative agencies may use adjudication and
rulemaking to formulate policy with force of law); see also Pa. Human Relations
Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 677 (Pa. 1977) (describing how
administrative agency law envisions that administrative agencies may proceed by
rulemaking or adjudication).
149. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.106(a)(2) (2010) (providing that Board
shall establish additional regulations with respect to mine safety if it finds existing
federal and state regulations inadequate); see also id. § 690.103(b) (3) (calling for
establishment of rulemaking process to expeditiously update mandatory health
and safety standards).
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problems with existing mine safety law, the EHB found that the
Board had been given new power to promulgate rules.15 0 The EHB
viewed the DEP's issuance of orders as an unauthorized revision
and an attempt to usurp power now granted to the Board under the
Act. 15 1 Despite charging the DEP with the duty to "take whatever
action it deems appropriate," out of fear of being unfair to mine
owners, the EHB diminished the force of the Act by limiting the
DEP's authority to issuing orders on the Act's unambiguously defined provisions. 152 While sections 109 and 501 seemingly grant full
authority to the DEP, the EHB determined that sections 103 and
106 mandate rulemaking; this interpretation makes the Act unclear
and allows procedural safeguards to stand in the way of the foremost goal of protecting lives.153
VI.

IMPACT

The immediate result of the EHB's decision in Emerald Coalwas
that Emerald and Cumberland were relieved from implementing
the DEP's recommendations from its orders. 154 Additionally, both
mining companies escaped criminal liability for failing to report
their violations.15 5 Beyond these immediate effects, the decision is
likely'to have broader significance because it delineates the DEP's
powers under the Act, sheds light on administrative agencies' abilities, and could couple with recent events in the mining industry to
foster a forceful call for improved safety. 156
150. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *10 (Krancer, J., concurring) (citing
Governor's signing statement declaring that Board will have power to write new
safety regulations, which DEP was unable to do under previous act); see also id. at
*4 (noting that legislature established Board as mechanism to add substance to
Act's provisions).
151. See id. at *5 (describing how DEP attempted to create across-the-board
rule that would have force of stare decisis and turn Board into "paper tiger" if
affirmed); see aso id. at *11 (Krancer, J., concurring) (declaring orders to be
"power grab" of "bait and switch, double-cross type" that is illegal and must be
forbidden).
152. For a discussion of the primary purpose of the Act, see supra notes 14145 and accompanying text; see also Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *6 (asserting
that citation for events not specifically defined in statute or regulations is "fundamentally unfair").
153. See 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 690.103 (a) (1) (2010) (expressing that most
pressing public interest and first priority of Act is protecting miners' health and
safety).
154. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *1-2 (listing violations and corrective
actions DEP ordered Emerald and Cumberland to take).
155. See id. at *6 (noting that criminal liability may follow issuance of orders,
and failure to notify DEP constitutes second degree felony under § 690.505).
156. For a discussion of the importance of the EHB's decision, see infra notes
157-84 and accompanying text.
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The Board Reigns Supreme: Restrictions on the DEP and
Administrative Agencies

The EHB's ruling granted great power to the Board, proclaiming that the Board has authority to decide what constitutes an interpretation and what amounts to an expansion of a regulation.15 7
Moreover, the EHB gave the Board authority over the DEP to determine how the Act will be implemented, subjecting the DEP's actions to the final say of the Board.15 8 The EHB did not identify
situations in which the DEP would be permitted to issue orders for
undefined circumstances, effectively curtailing the DEP's authority. 159 The holding that the Board's reading of the Act supersedes
the DEP's interpretation establishes strong precedent for the
Board's authority.1 6 0
While the EHB stated that it did not intend to completely foreclose future issuance of orders that are not "spelled out," DEP orders interpreting or expanding the Act are likely to be challenged
and overturned. 161 Additionally, if the DEP views the Emerald Coal
decision as a prohibition against identifying unlisted circumstances
as unusual enough to warrant an order, it may be less likely to issue
such orders in the future and instead err on the side of not risking
being overturned. 162 While the DEP's mandates that lack express
statutory support are on shaky ground, so too are DEP adjudications in other situations where rulemaking is on the table.16 3 Going
forward, the DEP will need to cite the statutory provision on which

157. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *4 (holding that legislature envisioned Board as means to expand upon statutory provisions).
158. See id. at *5 (finding that DEP was impermissibly attempting to create
across-the-board rule through orders to Emerald and Cumberland, and that upholding orders would create binding, industry-wide rule).
159. See id. (relating intention not to completely "foreclose the possibility that
unique circumstances in some future case may justify the issuance of an order
requiring notification of an accident for an incident not clearly spelled out in
[s]ection 104.").
160. See id. at *7 (finding that employing Board's deliberative standard-making expertise is better policy than making up law on ad hoc basis).
161. For an examination of limitations on DEP's power, see supra notes 12140 and accompanying text.
162. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *15 (Mather, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (describing how holding deprives DEP of authority to issue
orders identifying unanticipated events that occur at mines and qualify as
accidents).
163. Id. at *4 (asserting that DEP's choice to proceed by adjudication or
rulemaking must be "reasoned, fair and consistent with the enabling statute's
framework").
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it relies and document such authority to adjudicate when issuing an
order in connection with the Act. 164
The decision in Emerald Coal speaks to situations beyond DEP
and Board interactions; it demonstrates a significant limitation on
an administrative agency.16 5 While agencies can generally create
law through either promulgation or adjudication,1 6 6 an agency's
use of its discretionary powers should conform to legislative intent.16 7 When an act specifically calls for rulemaking, the legislature's intent for a prescribed procedure is more than just a
suggestion.168 By instituting a specific rulemaking mechanism, as
the Pennsylvania General Assembly did in order to guarantee the
input of interested parties, the legislature can limit an agency's ability to act on its own authority.169
When an agency makes a decision that applies to parties beyond particular litigants, rulemaking procedures are generally a
more fitting choice. 170 As adjudication and rulemaking are suited
for different purposes, the legislature can pass statutory provisions
to restrict administrative agencies' powers and ensure that the legislature's intent is carried out.171 As long as it is the legislature's true
intent to limit agency discretion, its statutes should override the
power of an administrative agency.' 72 Future litigants challenging
administrative agencies' actions when a rulemaking procedure ex-

164. See id. at *6 (observing that legislature did not list events by which DEP
attempted to issue violations).
165. For a discussion of administrative agencies' lawmaking powers, see infra
notes 166-73 and accompanying text.
166. See Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671,
677 (Pa. 1977) (holding that administrative agencies may proceed by either
rulemaking or adjudication).
167. See R & R Mktg., L.LC. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 729 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1999)
(stating that administrative agency's decision may not violate express or implied
legislative policies).
168. Emerald Coal 2010 WL 944146 at *4 (noting that Act provides for
rulemaking for first time in history of Pennsylvania mine safety law).
169. See id. at *11 (Krancer, J., concurring) (finding that, in face of legislature's actions, DEP's decision to act unilaterally and write regulations was illegal).
170. In re Shenif's Officer (PC2209) and Sheriff's Officer Sergeant (PC2215J),
Gloucester County, 543 A.2d 462, 464 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (stating that
rulemaking procedures are implicated when subject matter of agency determination concerns matters beyond individual litigants and involves general administrative policies).
171. For a discussion of adjudication and rulemaking, see supra notes 71-90
and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of legislative intent, see supra notes 80-86 and accompa-

nying text.
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ists could point to the EHB's decision in Emerald Coalas an example
of a restriction on agency adjudicative power.' 7 3
B.

Potential Outcry for Effective Safety Measures

In the wake of the disaster at the Copiapo Mine in Chile, the
EHB's decision to hold the Act's rulemaking procedure above its
substantive call for safety may be unpopular.1 74 Safety is of the utmost importance in mining; mining companies often tout their excellence in safety, and Alpha Natural Resources LLC (Alpha), the
parent company of both Emerald and Cumberland, is no exception.1 75 Alpha maintains a "Running Right Safety Process," under
which all employees are expected to identify hazards and initiate
corrective actions.176 In addition, many of Alpha's mining operations have won safety awards in recent years.17 7
Despite this safety awareness, the Emerald and Cumberland
mines only mustered awards for participation in a mine rescue competition in 2010.178 Both were also included in a "blitz" of inspections by the MSHA following the Upper Big Branch disaster, an
effort which targeted fifty-seven mines with histories of significant
and/or repeat violations.17 9 While Alpha is striving to improve its
safety, Emerald, Cumberland, and Alpha subsidiary AMFIRE Min173. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *5 (refusing to allow DEP's unilateral action in face of call for rulemaking to become binding precedent).
174. SeeVictor Herrero, All 33 Miners Rescued from Chile Mine, USA TODAY, Oct.
14, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-10-12-Chile-minersN.htm
(detailing rescue at Chilean copper mine, where thirty-three miners were trapped
underground for sixty-eight days).
175. See Press Release, Mine Safety & Health Admin., MSHA Launches Inspection Blitz in Nation's Coalfields (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.msha.gov/
Media/PRESS/2010/NR100421.asp (listing mines targeted by MSHA for emergency inspections in wake of Upper Big Branch explosion and noting that Emerald
and Cumberland mines are owned by Alpha Natural Resources LLC).
176. See Running Right Safety Process, ALPHA NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.alphanr.com/safety/process/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (describing how reporting is anonymous, allowing hazards to be confronted and dealt with
immediately).
177. See Safety Awards, ALPHA NAT. RESOURCES, http://www.alphanr.com/
safety/awards/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2011) (detailing safety
awards won by Alpha-owned mines in 2008 and 2009).
178. See Two Alpha NaturalResources Affiliates Win Nationwide Mine Rescue Competition, CNN MONEY (Oct. 8, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/prnewswire/CG79049.htm (noting that Emerald won Division 2 First Aid
Competition and Cumberland placed second in Division 2 Mine Rescue Skills
Competition).
179. See Press Release, supra note 175 (listing Emerald and Cumberland as
only two mines operated by Alpha subjected to inspections focusing on safety standards concerning methane, mine ventilation, and rock dusting, all of which can
cause mine accidents).
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ing Co. had 740 accidents from 2005 to 2008, with overexertion,
falling, and being struck by an object constituting the three most
common causes of injury.18 0
At a time when mine safety has captured the attention of both
national and global audiences, the EHB chose to place its focus on
the Board's function.1 8 1 Even though the Act, unlike its predecessor, includes the word "safety" in its title, the EHB adhered to the
legislative process outlined in the Act and prohibited the DEP from
making independent rulings to protect miners.1 82 Against Judge
Mather's wishes, the EHB stripped the DEP of its ability to do everything necessary to ensure miners' safety by restricting the DEP from
issuing orders for events outside those explicitly listed in section
104.183 As a result, the EHB recast the intent of the Act; rather than
a bastion of protection for the health and safety of miners, the EHB
deemed the Act a safeguard of a more balanced legislative approach to promulgating mine safety regulations.1 8 4
William Gallagher*
180. See Anya Litvak, Accidents and Deaths at Pennsylvania Mines, PirrSBURGH
Bus. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, http://bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/datacenter/acci(ofdentsanddeaths-atpennsylvaniamines.html?appSession=12781575482696
fering total reported accidents at Alpha from 2005 to 2008, noting most common
causes of injury, and citing finger and back as most commonly injured areas).
181. Emerald Coal Res., L.P. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2009-023L, 2010 WL 944146, at *4 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 24, 2010) (observing that
Act provides for rulemaking for first time in history of Pennsylvania mine safety
law).
182. See id. at *10-11 (highlighting remarks by Governor Rendell, Secretary
McGinty, and Secretary Hanger detailing how Act and Board will improve efficiency and accountability in rulemaking and enforcement process).
183. For a list of the powers given to the DEP under the Act, see supra notes
140-45 and accompanying text.
184. See Emerald Coal, 2010 WL 944146 at *15 (acknowledging that ruling deprives DEP of authority to issue orders identifying unanticipated events at mines
which qualify as accidents). For an examination of the importance of the rulemaking process, see supra notes 12240 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Villanova University School of Law; B.B.A., 2009, Emory University.
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